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Abstract: Recent experimental evidence suggests that some people dislike telling 
lies, and tell the truth even at a cost. We use experiments as well to study the 
socio-demographic covariates of such lie aversion, and find gender and religiosity 
to be without predictive value. However, subjects’ major is predictive: Business 
and Economics (B&E) subjects lie significantly more frequently than other 
majors. This is true even after controlling for subjects’ beliefs about the overall 
rate of deception, which predict behavior very well: Although B&E subjects 
expect most others to lie in our decision problem, the effect of major remains. An 
instrumental variables analysis suggests that the effect is not simply one of 
selection: It seems that studying B&E has a causal impact on behavior.  
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1. Introduction 
A recent experimental literature shows that people often tell the truth, even at 
some personal cost (Gneezy, 2005; Fischbacher and Heusi, 2008, Erat and Gneezy, 
2009; Lundquist et al., 2009). This evidence contrasts with the standard homo 
economicus view that all agents are self-interested money-maximizers, and suggests 
that people’s preferences in this regard are significantly more complex. In particular, it 
has been suggested that some people have a preference for being honest and dislike 
lying (e.g., Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2004; Kartik, 2009; López-Pérez, forthcoming). 
An ability to predict such incentives would be of great benefit in many economic 
settings. Therefore a careful examination of the extent to which various observable 
socio-demographic indicators such as gender, field of study (major), political ideology, 
and religiosity show a consistent correlation with a preference for honesty or lie 
aversion seems warranted. In this paper, we use an experiment with a simple decision 
problem that isolates lie aversion from other motivations mentioned in the literature in 
order to investigate these potential covariates. 
Some of the indicators mentioned seem likely candidates to correlate with a 
preference for honesty. For instance, many religions expressly encourage pro-social 
behavior and commend truth-telling; one might therefore expect strong religious beliefs 
to correlate with honest choices. With respect to gender, Croson and Gneezy (2009) 
review a growing experimental literature documenting subtle gender differences in 
preferences. For a preference for honesty, though, significant uncertainties still remain. 
While Dreber and Johannesson (2008) and Erat and Gneezy (2009) find differences 
between men and women in sender-receiver games, Lundquist et al (2009) and Holm 
and Kawagoe (2010) do not observe a correlation between gender and honest behavior.  
Another issue concerns the relation between major and honesty. Several 
experimental studies report that economics students conform more closely to the homo 
economicus “ideals” than do those from other disciplines – see Marwell and Ames 
(1981) on public-good experiments, Frank, Gilovitch and Regan (1993, 1996) in a 
Prisoners’ Dilemma context,  and Carter and Irons (1991) on the Ultimatum Game.1 
More specifically related to our study, economics students in Lundquist et al. (2009) 
lied more than subjects from other fields. However, a perennial issue is causation. Does 
                                                 
1 However, Stanley and Tran (1998) report no difference in an Ultimatum Game, and Yezer, Goldfarb and 
Poppen (1996) find economists more likely to return an experimental “lost letter”. 
studying economics give people “maximizing” habits of thought, and thus cause them to 
behave more in line with its own predictions, or do people already inclined towards 
such behavior tend to self-select into economics? Our demographics include stated 
political position, which is a plausible instrument to test this. A good instrument must 
be correlated with the endogenous predictor, and exogenous to the outcome. In this 
case, it is intuitively plausible – and will be statistically confirmed – that students for 
business and economics tend to be more politically conservative (that is, identify 
themselves as more right-wing) than others. This establishes the relevance of the 
instrument. For the exogeneity, note that political position is measured on a semantic 
differential scale from left to right. There is no a priori reason to think that left- or right-
wing people will be more likely to lie, so no a priori reason to think that political 
position will correlate with behavior. This, again, is subjected to an over-identifying 
restrictions test, which it passes.   
We finally note that our analysis controls for a potential effect of beliefs on 
preferences and honest behavior. In effect, it has been argued (Cialdini, Reno and 
Kallgren, 1991; Bicchieri, 2006; Erat and Gneezy, 2009; López-Pérez, forthcoming) 
that normative behavior, including honest behavior, may be sensitive to expectations 
about how others will act. That is, people may be more likely to comply with an honesty 
norm if they expect many others to respect it as well. Since we elicit the expectations 
for truth-telling, we can clarify whether, say, a potential correlation between major and 
honesty is due to subjects from different majors having different expectations. 
Our results indicate that Business and Economics (B&E) students are more 
likely to lie in our experiment than are students from other fields. Instrumentation with 
political ideology, moreover, suggests that the effect may be causal: B&E education 
does more than select students who make this choice; it seems actually to increase the 
chances of the behavior. Although we find that expectations are highly significant 
predictors of honesty and that B&E students tend to be pessimistic in their expectations 
of honest behavior, the correlation between major and truth-telling still persists. Overall, 
gender is not associated with the decision to lie, and religion is similarly lacking in 
predictive value. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section describes our 
experimental design and procedures. In turn, section 3 reports the results from our 
experiment and the instrumental variables analysis. Section 4 concludes. 
2. Experimental Design and Procedures 
The decision problem considered in our experiment is extremely simple. A 
random process with common-knowledge distribution generates a colored circle (blue 
or green, henceforth called the signal) on a computer screen. A ‘sender’ observes the 
signal and sends a message to a ‘receiver’, indicating either “The blue circle has 
appeared” or “The green circle has appeared”. The sender earns 14/15 Euros for saying 
the color is “blue”/“green”, irrespective of the true color. Consequently, she faces a 
dilemma between honesty and material interest if the signal happens to be blue. The 
receiver, in turn, receives a payoff of 10 Euros irrespective of either the message or the 
true color. In fact, he is uninformed of the true color, and hence cannot verify whether 
the message received is false or true. The description of this decision problem is 
common knowledge, so the receiver does know the probabilities of each color signal.2 
Our design allows us to analyze the correlation between pure lie aversion and 
our socio-demographic variables. To clarify this point, note first that a lie-averse sender 
should announce the true color of both signals.3 Further, there seems to be no other 
plausible reason to announce the true color that a preference for honesty. Indeed, a 
selfish sender should always announce ‘green’. The same is true even if the sender is 
altruistic: There is no altruistic reason to tell the truth as the receiver always gets 10 
Euros, even if he is deceived. Similarly, guilt-aversion as in Charness and Dufwenberg 
(2006) is irrelevant because the receiver’s payoff expectations are fixed. In short, it 
seems safe to assume that any sender who announces always the true color has a 
preference for honesty.  
We conducted 20 computerized sessions (10 High and 10 Low) at the 
Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, with a total of 258 participants.  The software used 
for our sessions was z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). After being seated at a visually 
isolated computer terminal, each participant received written instructions that described 
the game (these may be consulted in the appendix). Subjects read the instructions at 
                                                 
2 We considered two treatments, varying the probability of the blue signal (0.25 vs. 0.75). Since there are 
no significant differences in truth-telling rates across treatments (consult López-Pérez and Spiegelman, 
2011), all results are pooled across those treatments. 
3 This prediction holds true if the utility of earning 1 additional Euro is lower than the disutility of lying 
(see again López-Pérez and Spiegelman, 2011 for details), a condition which does not seem to be 
restrictive. Incidentally, this point partially accounts for our payoff constellation: a lie-averse sender could 
decide not to tell the truth if the cost of that behavior was high, making thus impossible to discriminate 
between lie-averse and selfish agents. 
their own pace and we answered their questions in private. We used neutral language 
and avoided terms such as “lie”. 
Each session then consisted of a number of steps, which all subjects knew from 
the start. In chronological order: First, participants were anonymously matched in pairs. 
Second, all chose as if they were senders. We used the strategy method; that is, before 
knowing the actual realization of the random signal, subjects indicated what message 
they would send for each possible realization of the signal (blue/green). In this manner, 
we maximized the amount of data gathered.4 Third, we elicited first- and second-order 
beliefs from all subjects in an incentive-compatible manner. More precisely, first-order 
beliefs refer to beliefs about the proportion of subjects who send the ‘green’ message 
when the signal is blue, that is, the percentage of subjects who lie in that situation. 
Second-order beliefs are beliefs about the average first-order beliefs by other subjects. 
Fourth, one subject in each pair was randomly selected as the real sender, the other as 
the receiver. Fifth, the color of the circle was generated based on the relevant 
probability (conditional on treatment), the sender informed of the actual color, and the 
message previously selected by that sender sent to the corresponding receiver. Sixth, we 
collected several socio-demographic variables from the participants, including gender, 
major, religiosity and political ideology. Finally, subjects were paid in private by an 
assistant who was not informed about the details of the experiment. Each session lasted 
approximately 40 minutes, and subjects earned on average 12.70 Euros. 
3. Results 
3.1 Correlation among the variables 
Let strategies be specified such that (G, B) indicates the message vector (‘Green 
if signal is green’, ‘Blue if signal is blue’), and so on. In the full sample (N = 258), 
50.78, 38.76, 8.14, and 2.33 percent of the subjects respectively chose the message 
vector (G, G), (G, B), (B, B) and (B, G). That is, the most frequent choices (89.53% of 
the total) correspond to the ‘payoff maximizing’ (G, G) and ‘honest’ (G, B) strategies, 
while other strategies are much less frequently chosen. A total of 21 subjects chose the 
payoff minimizing strategy (B, B), and six chose the “pathological” (B, G) strategy. 
Table 1 shows an overall picture of the demographics of the three main behavioral 
groups – to simplify the table, we do not include the small group of (B, G) subjects.   
                                                 
4 We have run a control treatment to check for possible effects of the strategy method on behavior, and 
we observe no significant effect (see López-Pérez and Spiegelman, 2011). 
Strategy N B&E Hum Other Foe Sex Religion Politics 
53.86 0.45 3.34 4.4 Honest 
(G,B) 99 18 37 44 2.928 0.05 0.277 0.182 
84.527 0.489 3.565 4.878 Maximizer 
(G,G) 131 50 26 55 1.693 0.044 0.228 0.161 
50.81 0.762 4.048 5.286 Minimizer 
(B,B) 21 9 4 8 6.586 0.095 0.603 0.448 
69.548 0.496 3.516 4.722 
Total 251 77 67 107 1.836 0.032 0.169 0.118 
Note: Columns B&E, Hum and Other respectively show the number of subjects from Business & 
Economics, Humanities, and other majors choosing the corresponding strategy. For the rest of variables, 
defined as follows, we report the mean and standard error conditional on strategy choice. Foe: first-
order beliefs; Sex: percent male; Religion: scale of 1 (not religious) to 10 (deeply religious); Politics: 
scale of 1 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right). Sample restricted to “non-pathological” liars.  
Table 1: Demographic breakdown of non-pathological subjects 
The table shows that overall there was relatively little socio-demographic 
difference between the honest and maximizing groups. Minimizers appear distinct 
(more males, more religious, and farther to the right), but the small numbers leave the 
statistics inconclusive. Further, there is a significant relationship between program of 
study (major) and strategy (Pearson Chi-square (4) = 16.24; p < 0.01), and a quite 
remarkable difference between maximizers and the rest in terms of stated first-order 
expectations (Mann-Whitney; p < 0.01). Interestingly, while minimizers are closer to 
the maximizers in their politics, religion and major status, they state expectations 
similar to the honest. 
Because major appears predictive of behavior, Table 2 shows the percent of 
subjects from each major choosing the “honest” strategy (Table A in the appendix also 
provides socio-demographic data on the average subject from each major). Because 
many of the majors were represented by only a few individuals, however, we generally 
group them together in the analysis. Based on the previous literature, we had some 
expectations that business and economics (B&E) students would comprise a 
behaviorally distinct group. Therefore the “main groups” classification on the bottom of 
the table sets B&E students apart. It also separates Humanities students, who comprised 
the largest single group, and were also behaviorally distinct (see below). 
 
 
 Major Bus Econ Hum Sci Law Eng Psych Others Total 
N 47 32 70 28 21 12 29 18 257 
0.234 0.219 0.529 0.464 0.524 0.250 0.414 0.278 0.385 
(G,B) 
0.062 0.074 0.060 0.096 0.112 0.131 0.093 0.109 0.030 
Main Groups B&E Hum Other Total 
N 79 70 108 257 
0.228 0.529 0.407 0.385 
(G,B) 
0.047 0.060 0.048 0.030 
Note: All subjects included except one who did not report his/her major (N = 257). (G, B) denotes the 
percent of each category choosing the “honest” strategy; mean and standard error values are reported. 
Bus = business; Econ = economics; Hum = humanities; Sci = science; Eng = engineering; Psych = 
psychology. The group ‘Other’ comprises all students who are not in Bus, Econ, or Hum. 
Table 2: Honest behavior, conditional on major 
Table 2 shows a significant variation in honesty rates across majors, ranging 
from more than 50% among humanities and law students to less than 25% among 
engineers and economists.5 On a more aggregate level, only 22.8% of the B&E subjects 
chose strategy (G, B), whereas 45.5% of the (pooled) non-B&E subjects did so, a 
significant difference (Mann-Whitney test; p-value < 0.01). Among those other subjects, 
the highest rate of honesty was found in the humanities. The average rate of the 
“honest” profile outside the humanities (i.e., including B&E) was 33.5%; for the 
humanities it was 52.9% (Mann-Whitney p-value < 0.01). Note that Fisher’s exact test 
rejects independence between honesty and major classification (p < 0.01).  
Thus our data seem to corroborate the pattern discussed above, that B&E 
students are more likely to be “maximizers” than are others. To further investigate this 
issue, Table 3 reports the results from a series of marginal effects probit regressions of 
honesty on our socio-demographic variables. We use the main classifications of major 
from Table 2, above, and construct indicator values for each quartile of the religiosity 
variable. In addition, we consider the subjects’ self-reported first-order beliefs about 
deception (recall, the percentage of subjects expected to send the ‘green message’ after 
the blue signal), and investigate any potential treatment effect due to the probability of 
the signal.  
 
                                                 
5 We have received the comment that it makes sense to include engineering students in the B&E category, 
as “mathy thinkers”. While this would only strengthen the results in this paper, we refrain from doing so 
because of the ad hoc nature of the adjustment, after viewing the data.  
  (a) All variables (b) B&E vs. others (c) Hum vs. others 
 ME S.E. p ME S.E. p ME S.E. p 
B&E -0.15 0.08 0.07 -0.18 0.07 0.02      
Hum 0.09 0.08 0.26       0.15 0.07 0.05
Sex -0.08 0.07 0.26 -0.08 0.07 0.24 -0.09 0.07 0.15
High 0.05 0.07 0.42 0.05 0.07 0.44 0.04 0.07 0.50
R2 -0.07 0.09 0.49 -0.07 0.09 0.49 -0.08 0.09 0.39
R3 -0.10 0.08 0.22 -0.10 0.08 0.20 -0.11 0.08 0.17
R4 -0.01 0.09 0.89 -0.01 0.09 0.91 -0.05 0.09 0.61
Foe -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00
Notes: Marginal effects (ME) estimates on the probability of honesty versus pooled other strategies, 
standard error (S.E.) and the p-value for a zero null hypothesis. For all independent variables except 
Foe, ME evaluates the effect of the change of the corresponding dummy from 0 to 1. The variable 
Sex refers to a dummy for gender (male = 1). B&E and Hum are as defined above. The variable High 
takes value 1 if the subject participated in the treatment in which the probability of the blue signal 
was 0.75. R2, R3, and R4 refer to second, third, and fourth quartile of stated religiosity, respectively. 
Foe indicates first-order beliefs. N = 257 for all regressions. 
Table 3: Covariates of honesty 
There are two important points in Table 3. First, expectations are highly 
predictive of behavior: an increase in reported expectations of other people’s dishonesty 
decreases the probability of an honest choice, roughly one-for-one. There are at least 
three possible interpretation of this correlation. To start, people might tend to respect 
norms only if they expect others to do so as well, as noticed in the introduction. Given 
our research goal, discounting the effect of beliefs is then crucial to prevent confounds 
(e.g., B&E subjects might lie more simply because they have particularly ‘pessimistic’ 
beliefs). In a different, yet related phenomenon, people might feel some discomfort or 
cognitive dissonance if beliefs about ‘normal’ behavior do not coincide with previous 
decisions. This would then support a tendency to manipulate their beliefs (possibly in an 
unconscious manner) about what constitutes such ‘normal’ behavior. That is, the beliefs 
may have been effect, rather than cause, of the previous choice.6 Finally, individuals 
might overstate the extent to which others have beliefs, desires and tendencies similar to 
their own, the so-called (false) consensus effect. Although controlling for beliefs could 
lead to an under-estimation of the marginal effect of our socio-demographic variables 
on honesty if any of the last two interpretations played a role, any potential statistical 
significance of these variables should not be lost.  
                                                 
6 In our experiment, we asked for beliefs about other people’s action after the subjects chose their own. 
This was done to eliminate the effect that priming social expectations might have on later behavior. 
In this respect, the second remarkable point in Table 3 is that, even accounting 
for the effect of beliefs, B&E students choose the honest strategy significantly less 
often. It is estimated to reduce the probability of an honest strategy by as much as 18 
percentage points. Notice from panel (b) that humanities students, compared to pooled 
others (that is, when the B&E variables are not included) are significantly more honest. 
However, when B&E are added this effect disappears (panel (a)), while the converse 
does not hold: the B&E indicator remains marginally significant even with the inclusion 
of the Humanities variable. We therefore conclude that the B&E effect is driving the 
Humanities effect, and focus in what remains on B&E versus pooled other subjects. 
None of the other determinants appear to be significant.  
3.2 Instrumental variable analysis 
We turn now to the question of the causal relationship between B&E status and 
maximizing behavior. As mentioned in the introduction, there are at least two important 
mechanisms of causality that may exist between these variables. First, it may be that 
learning about utility maximization and self-interest might lead subjects to apply a 
similar analysis to other situations. This would, in our case, mean that studying B&E 
has a causal impact on choosing the maximizing strategy (G, G). On the other hand, 
major choice is not random. Individuals choose what major they wish to pursue based 
on pre-existing interests. It might be that those who take up (or stay in) economics 
courses already have some “rationalistic” tendencies which would independently 
generate the maximizing behavior (G, G). Thus we have a classic case of unobserved 
self-selection leading to endogeneity of the explanatory variables, and thus a bias in the 
estimated effects, for instance, in Table 3. 
A common approach to addressing such problems consists of instrumental 
variables. This method has its inconveniences, especially in finite samples (Davidson 
and MacKinnon, 2004), but these drawbacks are generally seen as less serious than the 
endogeneity problems the methods are designed to solve. The estimation procedure is 
interpretable as a two-stage least squares, first regressing the endogenous predictor on 
the instruments, and then using the resultant projection to “correct” for the endogeneity 
(Greene, 2003). To constitute a valid instrument, a variable must satisfy two 
requirements: it must be correlated with the endogenous explanatory variable (that is, it 
must be “relevant”) and it must be exogenous to the outcome variable.  
Among the variables we gathered, political position seems a plausible choice for 
an instrument. Consider first the issue of exogeneity. There seems to be neither 
compelling a priori reasons why being an honest person would lead to any political 
opinion, nor the converse, reasons why identification with one political position over 
another would lead one to be more honest. While people of different political ideology 
disagree on many subjects, the importance of honesty does not seem to be one of them. 
Thus politics do not seem to have any link with honesty, apart from correlation with 
other factors that might influence such choices. This is the ideal situation for 
instrumental variables.  
More precisely, our analysis will use two related instrumental variables: (i) the 
stated political position, and (ii) the ideological quartile, as used for religiosity above. 
The number (i) between one and 10 seems to have less social significance than the rank 
(ii) within the distribution. Note also that variable (i) gives us more variation in the 
instrument. Finally, since expectations were revealed predictive, we choose this as a 
non-excluded instrument (a control variable) in the analysis. The inclusion of additional 
variables allows us to perform an over-identifying restrictions test to (partially) 
investigate whether the endogeneity has been successfully controlled (Stock and 
Watson, 2003). 
The other requirement for a valid instrument is relevance. Political position is 
quite strongly associated with major status, as Table A in the appendix suggests. In fact, 
a Mann-Whitney test of average political position across B&E status shows B&E 
students identify themselves as significantly more “right-leaning” than non-B&E 
students (p < 0.01). As a rule of thumb, Stock and Watson (2003, p.193) indicate that in 
the first stage of the IV regression procedure outlined above, the F-statistic for the 
overall model should be greater than 10 for a single endogenous variable. Regressing 
B&E status on expectations and political position yields a statistic of F (2, 254) = 19.72, 
which passes the test. When we run the regression on quartiles of politics, each of the 
quartiles is significant, with a high t-value. However, the constant term is close to zero, 
so the overall F (4, 252) = 9.34 does not pass the ‘rule of thumb’ test. Restricted to not 
having a constant, the F in this case rises to 41.57. Also, the subsequent IV regression is 
of much higher significance, as we see below.   
Table 4 presents the second-stage results of the instrumental variables 
estimation. Panel (i) considers political position as an instrument, whereas regression 
(ii) considers the political quartile (i.e., rank) as the instrument. We see that in both 
formulations, B&E status remains a significant predictor of (low) honesty. This means 
that the portion of the variation in B&E status that is shadowed by the exogenous 
political position does impact the probability of maximizing behavior, which suggests 
that there is exogenous causal impact of studying economics: economists lie more in our 
study in part because they have learned to do so.  
(i) Stated position (ii) Quartiles  
Coef. S. E. t P>t Coef. S. E. t P>t 
B&E -0.359 0.179 -2.010 0.046 -0.546 0.194 -2.820 0.005
Foe -0.006 0.001 -6.080 0.000 -0.006 0.001 -5.340 0.000
Constant 0.937 0.077 12.220 0.000 0.964 0.081 11.880 0.000
p 1.00  0.210  
Note: Second-stage results of 2SLS regression of B&E status and expectations (Foe) on the honest 
strategy. N = 257. The p-value corresponds to the Hansen-Sargan J statistic, explained below. 
Table 4: Second-stage regression results 
The non-excluded instrument in Table 4, first-order expectations, enables us to 
perform the Hansen-Sargan over-identifying restrictions test to investigate whether the 
endogeneity has been successfully controlled. This test resides in calculating the 
residuals from the regression above, then regressing the instruments upon them: all 
coefficients should be zero, if there is no correlation. The results of this regression can 
be used to calculate a statistic that distributes according to a chi-square distribution with 
degrees of freedom equal to the number of non-excluded instruments (recalling the 
over-identification in the name), under the null hypothesis that the instruments are 
exogenous. In our case, the J-statistic equals 0.00 in (i) and 1.57 in (ii), so that the 
instruments we choose pass this test: the hypothesis of exogeneity cannot be rejected.  
4. Conclusion 
Our results show that the subjects most likely to exhibit honest behavior in our 
decision problem are the non-B&E students, particularly if they expect this behavior 
from other subjects. In contrast, we do not find significant differences in honesty 
between males and females or between religious or non-religious people. In addition, an 
instrumental variable analysis suggests that the difference between B&E and other 
students is in part a matter of learning, and not only self-selection. Hence, our results 
are in accordance with other experiments showing that B&E students tend to conform 
more neatly with the homo economicus paradigm, or alternatively with a utilitarian or 
consequentialistic mode of reasoning in moral matters. 
The irrelevance of gender means that our study does not replicate the results in 
Dreber and Johannesson (2008, DJ henceforth) and Erat and Gneezy (2009, EG 
henceforth). Two potential reasons might explain this. First, there could be differences 
in the distribution of subjects’ majors across these two studies and our study, an 
important issue in view of our evidence that a subject’s major is correlated with 
honesty. If many female subjects come from the humanities and many male subjects 
come from B&E or engineering, the data may show a correlation between gender and 
honesty. 7 In general, our data suggests that an analysis based on gender alone can be 
potentially deceptive if females and males are not homogeneously distributed across 
majors, as seems the case in many western countries. In the game considered in DJ and 
some of the games in EG, second, altruism and honesty are interconnected. In these 
games, one player sends a false/true message to another player, who can use such 
information as a recommendation of play. Importantly, the message receiver will harm 
herself if she is deceived and follows the recommendation of play. If women are more 
altruistic (as some references cited in DJ and EG indicate), therefore, they might behave 
differently when communicating, even if they are not more lie-averse than men. 
We close by pointing out that some of the data reported here hints at new 
questions for future research. For instance, we observe that around 10 percent of the 
subjects acted as minimizers, sending the blue message in any contingency. As we 
argue in López-Pérez and Spiegelman (2011), this behavior is partially consistent with 
the hypothesis that some agents expect lies to be disapproved by others, and dislike 
being disapproved. Interestingly, minimizers are largely male, B&E students. In this 
line, it might be interesting to study further potential covariates of a dislike of 
disapproval.   
    
                                                 
7  Dreber and Johannesson (2008) and Erat and Gneezy (2009) do not control for the subjects’ major. In 
contrast, Lundquist et al. (2009) control for both gender and major and find no significant correlation 
between gender and honesty, while they find that students from the Stockholm School of Economics 
(SSE) are significantly more likely to lie than other subjects (at the 10% level). Holm and Kawagoe 
(2010) do not find either a relation between gender and lying. 
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Appendix 
Table A provides a picture of the average subject from each major, showing 
substantial difference between majors. Science students are the least religious, and 
psychology and the humanities are the majors with the greatest number of females in 
the sample (excluding “Other” due to its small size). Business, economics and law 
students are the most politically conservative, although only Business students claim to 
be “right of center”.8 They are also the most religious. Indeed religiosity is correlated 
with conservative politics in the sample, with a Spearman’s rho of 0.52 (p-value vs. 
independence = 0.000). 
 Full set of majors Main groups 
Major Sex Reli. Poli. (G,B) N Class Sex Reli. Poli. (G,B) N 
0.596 4.872 5.957 0.234 
Bus 0.072 0.425 0.274 0.062 47 
0.656 3.656 5.250 0.219 
Econ 0.085 0.446 0.348 0.074 32 
B&E 0.620 0.055 
4.380 
0.316 
5.671 
0.217 
0.228 
0.047 79 
0.429 3.057 4.071 0.529 
Hum 0.060 0.310 0.185 0.060 70 Hum 
0.429 
0.060 
3.057 
0.310 
4.071 
0.185 
0.529 
0.060 70 
0.536 2.071 3.964 0.464 
Sci 0.096 0.349 0.339 0.096 28 
0.667 4.286 5.429 0.524 
Law 0.105 0.648 0.406 0.112 21 
0.750 3.083 4.583 0.250 
Eng 0.131 0.743 0.434 0.131 12 
0.310 3.172 4.103 0.414 
Psych 0.087 0.474 0.278 0.093 29 
0.222 3.444 4.500 0.278 
Others 0.101 0.532 0.390 0.109 18 
Other 0.472 0.048 
3.139 
0.241 
4.444 
0.167 
0.407 
0.048 108 
0.506 3.498 4.720 0.385 Total 0.506 3.498 4.720 0.385 Total 0.031 0.167 0.116 0.030 257  0.031 0.167 0.116 0.030 
257 
Note: All subjects included except one who did not provide major information. Mean, standard error 
values reported over the categories at left, except for frequency, denoted N. Sex = percent male; Reli and 
Poli refer to “religion” and “politics”, and are defined as in Table 1. The column (G, B) shows the percent 
of the sample choosing the “honest” strategy. For majors, Bus = business; Econ = economics; Hum = 
humanities; Sci = science; Eng = engineering; Psych = psychology. The group ‘Others’ comprises all 
students who are not in Bus, Econ, or Hum. 
Table A: Descriptive Statistics by major 
 
 
                                                 
8 The value 5.5 would be the theoretical center-point of our scale.  
Appendix: Instructions 
Thank you very much for participating in this experiment, which is financed by 
a research fund. Our aim is to study how people make decisions. In total, more than 40 
people will participate in this study, in several sessions. There are no tricky questions, 
you must simply choose as you prefer. At the end of the experiment, you will be paid 
some money; the precise amount will depend on chance and your decisions during the 
experiment. It is very important that you do not talk to any other participant. If you do 
not follow this rule we will have to exclude you from the experiment and you will not 
earn any money. If you have questions, please raise your hand and we will assist you. 
 
Description of the Experiment 
 
  
In this experiment there are two types of participants (A and B). The basic task 
of each A is choosing a message for B. More precisely, towards the end of the 
experiment, A’s computer will randomly reveal either a blue circle or a green one – the 
probability of a blue circle is [75% in the High treatment, 25% in the Low treatment]. A 
will observe the circle in the screen and then send to B one of the following two 
messages: (i) ‘the blue circle has appeared’, or (ii) ‘the green circle has appeared’. 
Payoffs are as follows: A will always get 14 Euros if he/she announces that the blue 
circle appeared and 15 Euros if he/she announces green. The payoff of any B is 10 
Euros in any case. We remark that B will not observe the colour selected by the 
computer, but only receive A’s message.  
Since we want to know the message that you would send in any possible 
contingency, we will proceed according to the following protocol. To start, each of you 
will choose as if you were an A-participant. In addition, before knowing the color 
(blue/green) selected by the computer, you must indicate the message that you would 
send to B in two possible cases: (a) if the blue circle were selected and (b) if the green 
circle were selected. Afterwards, each of you will complete a short and anonymous 
questionnaire. Only then will your actual type be randomly determined (A or B with 
probability 50% each) and revealed to you. Moreover, each A-participant will be 
randomly matched with a different B-participant. If you happen to be A, you will see 
the color of the circle in the screen, and your corresponding message will be sent to B. 
If you are chosen to be B, you will receive the message chosen by A, and your previous 
responses to (a) and (b) will have no effect. Note well that you will never know the type 
of any other participant, nor will any other participant get to know your type. The 
decisions in this experiment are anonymous, that is, no participant will ever know which 
participant made which choice. For this reason, no participant will know the identity of 
the person with whom he/she is paired. 
The experiment will end with another short and anonymous questionnaire. Your 
payment will be made in private in an adjoining office by an assistant unrelated to this 
study. This assistant will only know your final payoff in this experiment, but not what 
you actually chose in the experiment.  
Before we start the experiment, please answer the following questions. Raise your 
hand when you are done so that we can verify the answers. 
In a hypothetical example, assume that the computer selects color _______________ 
(choose either ‘green’ or ‘blue’ to construct your own example), and that A had decided 
in that case to send message ___________________________________ (choose either 
‘green appeared’ or ‘blue appeared’ to construct your own example).  
For this hypothetical example, answer the following questions,  
 What would A’s payoff be? _______ 
 What would B’s payoff be? ___________ 
 What would A’s payoff be, if she/he had chosen the other message? ________ 
 What would B’s payoff be, if A had chosen the other message? ____________ 
In addition: 
 Will B ever know the color that actually appeared?     Yes          No 
 After your type has been determined and provided that you are of type A, can 
you change your prior choices?                                      Yes        No 
 Can A ever affect B’s balance?                    Yes        No 
 Can B ever affect A’s balance?             Yes   No 
 Do A’s choices affect A’s balance?             Yes   No 
 What is the probability that the circle is blue-colored? ____________ 
 
